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I.

INTRODUCTION

It is surely an interesting commentary on the perception of
academic international lawyers, that innumerable studies, despairing comments and impractical proposals have been written about
the essentially moribund international judicial process and equally
about the feeble international executive-resulting in a generally
negative lay perception of both the activities and the potentialities of international law and international government. On the
other hand, far less is being published about the relatively
vigorous international administrative process, though which, inter
alia, assistance worth billions of dollars is being distributed annually, and still less about the international legislative process by
which an increasingly substantial amount of international law is
steadily being created.' Indeed, because the greatest part of such
law relates to unfamiliar technical areas-which of course is
equally true of domestic legislation-the process by which it is
produced has remained generally unknown, unappreciated,
unstudied and unimproved.
In the course of attempting to establish an inventory of significant multilateral treaties (the principal, though by no means the
sole expressions of international law), this author and a colleague
have identified well over a thousand such instruments. Though a
few are just over a century old, the greatest bulk is of post-World
War II vintage. Currently well over a score of such instruments are
being promulgated each year and the general trend is upwards.
Taking as an example 1976, as the last year for which reasonably
complete information is available, at least 26 significant multilateral agreements were concluded, of which about a third are
potentially universal (ie., open to all or almost all states) and
several others are also of a world-wide scope (though not of poten* Principal Officer, Office of the Legal Counsel, United Nations. The views expressed
herein are not necessarily those of the United Nations.
One of the few essays on this subject is one recently published by the Legal Counsel of
the United Nations, Mr. Erik Suy, Innovations in InternationalLaw-Making Processes, in
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 187 (1978).
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tial interest to most states), while about half are regional. At least
five of these multilateral agreements established new international organizations, such as the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD), the International Maritime
Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) and the International Rubber
Council; six concerned environmental protection, including that of
the high sea, the Mediterranean and the river Rhine; two concerned commodities; wheat and rubber; three were labor conventions
promulgated by the International Labour Organisation (ILO);
three concerned cultural questions, such as the importation of
educational, scientific and cultural materials, the reciprocal
recognition of diplomas and the protection of the archeological and
historical heritage of the Americas; finally, some dealt with a
miscellany of subjects, such as space exploration, plurilingual extracts of civil status records, the limitation of liability for
maritime claims, the regulations of a regional trade area and
regional postal matters.
One reason, and one to which I shall revert several times, why
the international legislative process is so inadequately known and
insufficiently appreciated is that the arrangements for recording
and publicizing its products are so inadequate. There is no official
journal, nor any public or private source that systematically
reports on the promulgation of new multilateral treaties. Worse
yet, there exists no general compendium of all such treaties, and
still less any even rudimentary codification of international public
law as established by treaties Thus, it is most difficult to compile, without considerable research and often the need for some
luck or special connections, a complete list of treaties in a given
field (e.g., human rights, environmental protection, constitutions
of intergovernmental organizations, maritime matters), and even
after particular treaties are identified, there is no ready way to
obtain an up-to-date list of the parties to many of them or even to
determine whether they are already, or still, in force. It can only
be hoped that the next decades will see a marked improvement in
the documentation of international law, which is seriously defective in practically all respects, as this is a development that can,
unlike others relating to the international governmental process,
be achieved without major political decisions and by the mere ap' Such a project was suggested by C.W. Jenks in The Conflict of Law-making Treaties,
30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 401 (1953), in which he also complained that "[e]ven the texts [of
treaties] currently in force are not conveniently available." Id at 431.
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plication of sufficient resources. If necessary, it even could be
done on a private, academic basis should intergovernmental institutions not take up the challenge.
To assert that the international legislative process functions,
and perhaps functions better than most other international
governmental procedures, is not to claim that this process is
already perfect or even satisfactory. Indeed, it is imperfect in
several senses of the word: for example, the output of multilateral
treaties is clearly not adequate to govern any substantial fraction
of the matters requiring such regulation by international law; furthermore, to the extent treaties are produced they frequently
deal inadequately with the problems to which they are addressed.
In addition to these imperfections, which are of course also more
or less characteristic of the better established, integrated and
known national and local legislatures, there is one defect peculiar
to the international process: even after a treaty is adopted by a
collective decision, it does not enter into force until individually
accepted by a specified number of states, and even then it is, with
rare exceptions, not binding except on those states that have so
accepted it. This essay will consider in what ways and to what extent this international process is actually susceptible of amelioration under some reasonable hypotheses of good sense and good
will, and to what extent certain improvements would require such
drastic changes in international relations and procedures that
they cannot be anticipated within the present generation.
While the emphasis herein will be on that aspect of the international legislative process that proceeds through the formulation
of multilateral treaties, primarily those concluded on a universal
or at least a world-wide basis but also including significant regional
instruments, it should be recognized that there are also other
devices by which a limited body of international law is being produced, which perhaps may be used more extensively in the future.
These include: the conclusion of series of similarly formulated
bilateral or restricted multilateral treaties, if these are sufficiently numerous and substantively uniform; the articulation and
evocation of general principles of international law through
resolutions of sufficiently representative and authoritative international organs, though this is at best a slow, uncertain and controversial process; the slowly growing number of examples of certain technical international institutions that have regulation-making
competence in limited areas; and finally the creation by inter-
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governmental organizations of a body of international administrative law, which is itself rapidly developing but necessarily of quite
limited scope.
Turning now again to the treaty-making bodies, we find that
these include several in the United Nations, especially the
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, as well as
many of their subsidiary organs such as standing and ad hoc committees of the Assembly and the regional and functional commissions of ECOSOC; specialized and related agencies, including
those, like ILO, IMCO, or WIPO, that are primarily involved in
treaty-making and administration, and those, like the World Bank,
WHO, or the IAEA, that only occasionally venture into this field;
other world-wide organizations, such as the Customs Cooperation
Council (CCC), various fisheries commissions and commodity councils; and regional agencies, including primarily political ones such
as the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, the
Organization for African Unity and the League of Arab States, and
economic ones such as OECD, COMECON and LAFTA. In addition,
individual governments from time to time resume a function that
was peculiary theirs before the advent of international organizations, by proposing the conclusion of a treaty for some purpose and
convening an international conference therefor.
A contemplation of this plethora of more or less specialized
lawmaking organs immediately suggests why the international
legislative process is highly unsystematic and decentralized and
that, indeed, these characteristics are at once a reason for its
relative obscurity and for at least some of its imperfections. One
likely line of improvement that therefore comes to mind, even
before examining the details of the various stages of the process,
is the achievement of a greater degree of coherence and centralization. This might best be accomplished through the General
Assembly of the United Nations, at least in respect of all universal and world-wide treaties. Political realities being what they
are-and it should be appreciated that current international
dynamics involves not only the interaction of nation-states but
also of international organizations, even though these may have
substantially identical memberships-it seems unlikely that effective centralization can be achieved in the immediate future. But if
the international community becomes more alert to this problem,
and there are some indications that this is happening, it would
logically be the United Nations that would assume at least a
significant coordinating role. In the first place, this could involve
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the regular gathering and dissemination of up-to-date information
about the activities of all stages of the legislative process in
various international fora: what subjects are under study by each
treatymaking organ; what multilateral treaties are in the course
of being formulated; what treaties have been promulgated; and
what state action has taken place or is contemplated in respect of
all promulgated treaties, whether or not already in force. In the
second place, and this is an enterprise on which the General
Assembly has recently though only tentatively embarked,3 the
treaty-making process should be studied, at least with a view
to discovering whether any of the multitude of methods used
are superior to others and whether certain successful ones
developed in a particular context or in respect of a particular
agreement can be generalized. Though it is the United Nations
that is naturally called on to play such a central and coordinating role, there is no reason why its activities in this respect
cannot be reinforced or supplemented by other entities, including
private ones, which may even take the lead if the enterprise or
the resources of the public agencies should falter.
II.

THE MULTILATERAL TREATY-MAKING PROCESS

In embarking now on a brief analysis of the multilateral treatymaking process, it will be convenient to concentrate on several
stages in particular: the initiation of the process; the method of
formulating treaties; their adoption; and post-adoption activities.
It should, however, be realized that there is a degree of artificiality in such a division and that to a considerable extent these
stages, particularly the first three, overlap.
A.

INITIATION

The initiation of the legislative process is generally an unsystematic affair even on the national level, though less so where
the legislative initiative is in practice mostly exercised by the executive. On the international level the diversity of initiatives is
even greater, both because of the highly decentralized nature of
the entire process (which is not characteristic of national
legislatures) and because of the dearth of cumulative and up-todate information about treaty-making.
' G.A. Res. 32/48, Dec. 8, 1977, Review of the Multilateral Treaty-making Process. A
report by the Secretary-General in response to this resolution is due in 1980, which
is to be considered at 35th regular session of the General Assembly.
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That some coordination would be valuable is suggested by
several considerations. One is the desirability of creating as
coherent a body of international law as possible, avoiding both
gaps and overlaps between instruments relevant to the same
field. Another is the need to assure at least some efficiency and
rationality for the process, since the need for international law is
great and increasing as the number of states grows and the world
becomes more interdependent, while the resources required to
formulate that law remain limited; it would be sensible, therefore,
to establish priorities, taking into account the areas in which
new law is particularly needed, the likely difficulty in achieving
such law, the most appropriate organ for undertaking that
work (depending on whether it should be a universal, worldwide or regional agency and on whether it should be a technical or
a primarily political one) and whether a standing body or an ad
hoc one appears most suitable.
As already pointed out, in order to permit informed conclusions
about the aspects of international intercourse in which new law is
needed, the existing legislative texts should be readily available.
They should be supplemented not only by current information
about newly adopted instruments but also by data about instruments already in the process of being formulated. To make informed proposals about the best method of formulating a treaty in
a given area, it is necessary to have available information about
the activities and procedures of many different legislative bodies.
To permit effective coordination to take place, some agency,
presumably a subsidiary body of the U.N. General Assembly,
would have to absorb these data and develop these proposals.
Emphasis could be given to these proposals through endorsements
by the General Assembly in the form of recommendations addressed
both to the intergovernmental organizations concerned and to the
states of the world community, which ultimately control all these
organizations.
B.

FORMULATION

The most complicated and diverse stage in the treaty-making
process is, of course, that of formulating the instruments. This
may involve several sub-stages: preliminary studies, particularly
in technically complex fields; the preparation of initial drafts
by the secretariat of the competent organization, by a government or group of governments, by a non-governmental organiza-
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tion, by an expert body, by a representative body with restricted
membership, or even (though this is generally not practical) by a
plenary political body; finally, the consideration and development of those drafts may be undertaken in a succession of organs,
generally starting with small, expert and sometimes ad hoc ones
and moving to larger, more political and less specialized ones.
Throughout this stage there may be direct consultations with
governments, which supplement the deliberations of political
organs constituted of national representatives.
As this description suggests, this stage can by a very long one,
though its duration naturally depends, as in national legislatures,
on the complexity of the subject and the strength and diversity of
the views about it. In some instances, when a matter is considered
urgent and essentially non-controversial, a treaty may be formulated in one or two steps taking only several weeks or months.
In others, formulation may take half a generation or longer, or, indeed, not succeed at all; but in this, again, the international
legislative process is by no means unique.
One of the limitations of this stage, particularly under present
conditions, is the lack of sufficient manpower. Governments,
especially the smaller ones, frequently complain that they are
unable to keep up with the plethora of treaty-making activities, that
is, they cannot supply sufficient representatives and experts to all
the meetings and cannot properly review the many treaty proposals pending at any given time. A less serious constraint, but
still a significant one, is the capacity of the secretariats of the international organizations concerned, which must prepare the
necessary studies and drafts, solicit and analyze governmental
responses and service the meetings of expert and political bodies.
As the legislative agenda grows, the related budgetary requirements of the organizations also increase, both for their
secretariats and for these meetings. While it may seem anomalous
that treaties for which there is a perceived need should languish
at this stage (or perhaps before it, if it is decided to assign them a
low priority in view of more urgent projects), the limited capacity
of the international legislative machinery must be recognized and
taken into account.
The capacity of the world community to formulate legislation
will be expanded in part as more and more lawyers, particularly in
the developing countries, are trained to contribute to the process,
as members of international secretariats, as experts, as governmental representatives or as national officials charged with evaluating
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treaty proposals. Meanwhile, but even after this expansion has
taken place, the formulation of multilateral treaties should be
made as efficient as is compatible with the political and technical
difficulties inherent in the process, which often requires extended
time for negotiation, reflection and study in order to achieve
satisfactory results and general agreement. It can certainly not be
asserted that the present process is efficient: there are far too
many bodies, both standing and ad hoc. Many of these are
specialized, convened for individual sessions of essentially arbitrary duration (often determined by budgetary or scheduling
considerations) to deliberate on a particular instrument for the
time allotted, only to stop their work repeatedly and to restart it
again (after wasteful formalities) at subsequent sessions. It seems
likely that fewer bodies, meeting for longer periods or in effect
permanently, as do many national legislatures, could consider
several instruments simultaneously and continue working on each
until either a generally satisfactory text is achieved that can be
submitted to the next sub-stage (e.g., governmental comments or
discussion by a plenary representative body) or until a temporary
impasse is reached. Aside from other advantages of such a
method, experience shows that when a number of persons, even if
representing widely diverse interests or ideologies, work together
for extended periods in an organ or on a project, they tend to
evolve more productive working relationships than strangers
meeting episodically for brief intervals. Moreover, broader agendas, while possibly distracting, do give wider scope for reaching
compromises through the trading of concessions on a variety of
items. The examples of national and local legislatures suggests
that narrow specialization is the exception and that most of these
bodies deal, more or less simultaneously, with a broad range of
subjects.
One relatively recent development, which might enhance the efficiency of the international legislative process, is the emergence,
particularly within the United Nations and its related organizations, of ever firmer and better disciplined regional and other
groupings. Naturally there are certain drawbacks to this
phenomenon: at international gatherings, whether these are sessions of organs or conferences, an ever-increasing portion of the
schedule is consumed by unofficial meetings rather than by official
ones at which all participants are represented; only after each
group's position has evolved does the inter-group bargaining
begin. Furthermore, the largest of these groups, that of the
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developing states (sometimes called the Group of 77),' can, when
united, so substantially outvote all the other groups as to
discourage further bargaining under certain circumstances. For
example, if the participation of the out-voted groups is not considered essential, or if it can in any event be assured by the application of extraneous pressures, there is likely to be little
bargaining. Nevertheless, for the most part this "partification" of
the international political process can be welcomed as considerably enhancing its coherence. Individual delegations are less
apt to seek special ends reflecting merely the particular quirk of
an uninstructed delegate or an uninformed official in a national
capital. Moreover, the inter-group bargaining can be considerably
shortened when carried out principally by group spokesmen.
Though sometimes the latter represent the more radical, uncompromising wings of their group, for the most part leadership tends
to the moderates, who are intent on achieving results rather than
Pyrrhic political victories. It is yet too yearly to determine
whether the positive aspects of this development will generally
outweigh the negative ones, but the present signs are encouraging.
Another development worthy of notice, and of encouragement,
is the increased participation -naturally always in an advisory
rather than a decision-making role- of observers admitted to some
or all of the sub-stages of treaty formulation. Some of these entities
are essentially political, such as liberation movements acting as
surrogate representatives of a future state, but, for the most part,
they are expert international intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations that can give considerable substantive assistance in technical deliberations.
C.

ADOPTION

Throughout the stage of formulation, decisions must from time
to time be made in the several organs in which the treaty is evolving, but these are preliminary and taken with a view to the final
adoption and subsequent promulgation of the instrument. This
normally takes place either in the plenary of the most representative organ of the body concerned (e.g., the General Assembly of
the United Nations, the General Conference of ILO, the Con' From the number of these states represented among the 120 participants in the first
UNCTAD Conference in 1964; by now their number exceeds 110, that is over two-thirds of
the some 155 states participating in international organizations.
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sultative Assembly and the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe or a ministerial meeting of a U.N. regional economic
commission), or at an ad hoc plenipotentiary conference convened
by such an organ. It does not, indeed, make a great deal of difference which of these types of fora is chosen. A decision may depend on such factors as the competent organ's agenda and the anticipated difficulty of the final stage-i.e., whether a text has been
fully agreed, requiring only its formal adoption, or whether a
substantial amount of negotiation remains to be done.
More important than the formal designation of the body in
which final adoption takes place are its composition and its
decision-making procedures. As to the former, in most instances
the body is constituted so as to be representative of all potential
parties to the treaty, though there may be minor exceptions. For
example, the General Assembly often adopts treaties open to "all
States," including non-members such as Switzerland and the two
Koreas.
As for decision-making, the general formula rule that has
emerged in the post-World War II period is adoption by a twothirds majority of those voting for or against (but excluding from
the count abstainers, non-participants and absentees), with each
participating state entitled to cast a single vote. Major exceptions
include the ILO, with its tripartite representation of governments, employers and workers; the financial institutions (such as
the World Bank), where votes are weighted roughly in accordance
with capital subscriptions; and organizations, such as OECD, that
follow a strict unanimity rule. The general rule, however, is coming under more and more criticism as the discrepancy in size and
power of states widens; smaller states are emerging, are being
recognized, and are being admitted to international organizations.
In addition, the size of the virtually automatic majority that can
be mobilized by the developing states (many of which are the new
mini- and micro-states) has increased.
Naturally; proposals have been made for the adoption of some
means of weighted voting that would more "properly" reflect the
"significance" of the parties aligned on one side or another of international issues. The first obstacle to such a change is of course
political; as the great majority of the states at present voting in
international organizations considers that it benefits from the
existing rules, no voluntary change is likely and probably no involuntary one could be imposed. Perhaps still more serious is the
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likely impossibility of agreeing on any weighting formula. One
based on population (exemplified by the United States Supreme
Court's "one man one vote" rule), would give China some 25% of
all votes, four times as many as the United States would command. Military power is not readily measurable, and basing voting
strength on it would but increase the arms race. Economic
power would suit the Western states but hardly anyone else,
for political, ideological and perhaps even moral reasons. The
size of contributions to the organization, both assessed and voluntary, would seem ideal and perhaps stimulative of largesse, but
politically this too is a non-starter. One compromise advanced by
academic observers is a multi-chambered system, analogous to the
United States Congress, where in one chamber each state would
have one vote (thereby preserving the principle of sovereign
equality) while in on one or more others some type of weighting
would be used. In fact, as long as all of these chambers consist
of instructed representatives, unlike those in either House of the
United States Congress, there would be no need for the actual
constitution of several distinct chambers; instead a complex
voting formula could be used in a unitary organ, requiring the attainment of simultaneous majorities (which need not even be the
same ones) on the basis of several different weightings. For the
reasons already given, however, no serious consideration has yet
been or in the foreseeable future is likely to be given to a solution
along this line.
What is increasingly emerging is a qualified consensus rule. By
itself, a consensus requirement constitutes something of a reversion to the classical unanimity principle that was the typical rule
for international organs and conferences until the First World
War and largely even until the Second. It may be defined briefly
as taking a decision only when no participant opposes it so strongly as to insist on blocking it; a consensus can thus bridge wide,
though not all too deep, differences. But since an unqualified consensus rule still permits any participant to exercise a veto, and
thus, if determined and independent enough, to exact a high price
for its agreement, the now frequently used qualified rule maintains the possibility of reverting to voting if the consensus process breaks down. This alternative is, however, resorted to only if
the dissenters are considered to constitute a small, unreasonable
and substantively overrideable minority. In practice, the threat to
revert to voting is one merely maintained in the background to
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prevent any egregious abuse of the general desire to do business
by consensus.
It cannot be denied that resort to any consensus rule does have
disadvantages. One of these is the slowing of the entire process,
as at each stage prolonged attempts must be made to overcome
every genuine (even if objectively unreasonable) objection.
Another is that the end product is likely to reflect not the best
solution, or even the best that a majority could agree on, but
rather the least common denominator of agreement-which may
be low indeed. The countervailing advantage is, of course, some
guarantee of general acceptability, which is important in view of
the ultimate requirement that individual states ratify the treaty if
it is to achieve legal status. The deliberateness of the process may
also help to improve rather than degrade the product as solutions
are found that compromise initially irreconcilable positions, and
as individual governments utilize the delay to adjust to and accept
new realities and regimes.
As can be seen, the decision-making process in international
legislation is still evolving and no immediate breakthroughs seem
likely. Nevertheless, as more experience is gained with variously
adjusted rules, it may be hoped that improved procedures will
emerge to balance the conflicting requirements of sovereign
equality with a reasonable appreciation of the genuine disparity
among states, and the desire for speed in resolving urgent problems with the necessity of proceeding with due deliberation.
D.

POST-ADOPTION

On the domestic level the adoption of legislation concludes the
legislative process, but internationally it only moves it to another
and as yet quite unsatisfactorily functioning stage: securing of
the agreement of individual states, generally referred to as
ratification. Ratification is required for two purposes: for any
given multilateral treaty a minimum level of participation is set
(determined at the formulation stage, depending on the nature of
the instrument and based on some estimate of political realities)
before the treaty can enter into force at all; and in any event the
treaty is, even after entry into force, generally binding only on
those states that have ratified it.
There can be no doubt that this stage of the international
legislative process is both crucial and unsatisfactory.5 Too many
' See the study by 0. Schachter et. al, Wider Acceptance of Multilateral Treaties,
UNITAR Series No. 2 (1969).
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treaties, born after long travail through the earlier stages, remain
moribund for years while the minimum number of participants required for entry in force is assembled. Even more agreements
are permanently enfeebled by a low level of participation, particularly by the absence of many powerful or otherwise significant
states.
One source of the difficulty can be found on the international
plane. Except in a few organizations, there is no systematic
mechanism for following up on state action in respect of treaties
formulated by the organization, except perhaps for sporadic
reminders and pleas adopted by interested organs. Naturally,
better results are achieved where the constitution of an international organization (e.g., of ILO and WHO)6 requires member governments at least to initiate the domestic ratification
process and to report periodically thereon to an international
organ. In other cases, secretariats have been charged or have
taken it on themselves to follow up on treaties, prodding governments and offering whatever assistance they can in overcoming
domestic obstacles.
The real difficulty, however, lies with the generally quite inadequate domestic procedures for adopting or ratifying international
legislation. On one hand, treaties are sometimes considered as if
they were some species of domestic legislative proposals, subject
to examination and improvement de novo, instead of being the
largely unalterable (except through limited reservations or difficult amendments) end products of an already extensive
legislative process. The inability to change these instruments,
rather than accelerating their consideration, may lead to their being shunted aside indefinitely unless some strong domestic sponsor can be found. On the other hand, treaties may, as in the United
States, be relegated to a traditional mechanism attuned not to the
flood of law-making treaties of the 20th Century but to the occasional treaties of alliance of the 18th, whose ratification was surrounded by special parliamentary safeguards and obstacles, but
which now act as bottlenecks effectively preventing participation
in a large body of international law. These national obstacles must
await national remedies. Certainly the treaty-approval process, at
least insofar as it relates to multilateral legislative instruments,
' See Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, adopted Oct. 9, 1946, 62
Stat. 3485, T.I.A.S. No. 1868, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, Article 19(5); Constitution of the World
Health Organization, opened for signature July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, T.I.A.S. No. 1808, 14
U.N.T.S. 185, as amended 26 U.S.T. 990, T.I.A.S. 8086, Article 20.
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should be freed of any special constraints inappropriate to it. At
the same time, it may be necessary to involve selected members
of national legislatures in the international process from an early
stage, so that their ideas for changes and improvements can be
tested in the competent international fora while instruments may
still be changed. Then, after their having participated in the international formulation, it may be hoped that these legislators will
ease the process of domestic approval.
Here too, an up-to-date inventory of law-making treaties, including those in force and those awaiting approval by states,
would probably be helpful both on the international and the national plane. Such a list, with an indication of which states are
eligible to but have not yet taken steps to participate in particular
treaties, could by its very existence serve as a spur to national action and also alert international organizations to the states they
should approach to urge ratification.
Finally, some mention should be made of certain limited exceptions to the generally rigid requirement of individual ratifications
for treaties to achieve legal force. One of these has become common in respect to the constitutions of international organizations,
which are amended much like other types of treaties are made or
amended, except that the amendment usually enters into force for
all members of the organization as soon as the specified number of
ratifications (usually two-thirds) has been attained, thus binding
even those that did not ratify the change;7 generally, however,
they then have the option of withdrawing from the organization.
The reasons for this exception are the absolute necessity of
preserving the legal unity of a constitution and the undesirability
of delaying each change until all members have individually consented. Another exception, which in a sense goes still further, permits some technical organizations to adopt regulations that
thereupon enter into force for all members, though usually
permitting them to opt out by giving a specific notification.' Both
of these procedures may be helpful harbingers of developments in
this final stage of the international legislative process, but it is probably illusionary to hope that states will soon consent to any
general substitution of these narrow and limited exceptions for
the usual requirement of individual ratification.
See WHO Constitution, supra note 6, at Article 73.

See WHO Constitution, supra note 6, at Article 22.
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CONCLUSION

It may confidently be expected that during the next decades
significant improvements in the international legislative process
will occur. Some of these will, no doubt, evolve through trial and
error, as individual organizations strive to improve their procedures to accord with the perceived necessities of the time. It
may, however, be hoped that such inchoate groping for better
methods may be guided and speeded with the aid of systematic
studies of the legislative process, such as those recently initiated
by the General Assembly and by the International Law Association. Although such improvements may not actually achieve, they
may at least bring us closer to, Tennyson's vision of a parliament
of man, in which the common sense of most creates universal law. 9
'

Tennyson, LOCKSLEY HALL, lines 128-30 (1842).

